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ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY: IMPLICATIONS
OF OVERLOADED AGENDAS
RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS*

During the past decade the United States government has moved
vigorously into a major involvement in environmental protection,
responding to the accumulation both of objective evidence and of
citizen concerns that made of it a sudden but potent political issue.
For similar reasons, although the specific events vary, it has involved
itself equally vigorously in the subject of energy policy since 1973.
In each case a sudden and sharp increase in political concern has
precipitated extensive legislation, reorganization of agencies, addition
of new functions of government, and expanded staff and budgets.
One unanticipated and unwelcome effect of this vigor, however,
has been to overload the agenda of the Executive Branch: federal
agencies have been given both more problems than they have the
knowledge or resources or organization to solve, and in some cases,
more resources and organizational changes-at least in the short runthan they can efficiently and effectively utilize.
This paper discusses sources, characteristics, and results of the
recent overload in environment and energy agendas, and evaluates
strategies for coping with them. It suggests that these strategies can
and should be improved, particularly by making the establishment of
priorities for administrative implementation more conscious and
more accountable; and it suggests means for doing so. The issue is
potentially relevant not only to U.S. environment and energy policies, the examples used here, but to any policy problem which any
government seeks to "solve" by dramatic increases in authority and
resources and changes in organizational structure.
BACKGROUND

American government has generally dealt with complex problems
by fragmenting them among specialized agencies and bureaus, and by
attending to them sequentially rather than all at once. 1 This pattern
has been particularly apparent in federal and state governments. Its
result is the well-known structure of mission-oriented agencies, each
*Associate Professor and Chairman, Natural Resource Policy and Management Program,
University of Michigan.
1. D. BRAYBROOKE & C. LINDBLOM, A STRATEGY OF DECISION (1963).
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specializing in its own area-health, education, transportation, agriculture, water resource development, and so forth-with a reasonably
clear mission and an authorized set of means by which to pursue it.
A classic example is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. An engineering agency established to meet military needs during and after the
Revolution, in 1824-following the dramatic success of New York
State's Erie Canal-it was given a mission to improve the navigability
of inland waterways, by such means as surveys and eventually snagging and clearing, dredging, and levee construction.2 Its staff was
comprised of individuals trained in professions directly relevant to its
mission, and its task was the achievement of that mission at the least
public cost-irrespective of other public values that might be affected
by its activities. Other mission agencies operated in basically similar
fashion: road construction agencies staffed by highway engineers,
public land management agencies staffed by foresters to produce
timber, public health agencies staffed by sanitarians to regulate the
quality of drinking water.
In addition to fragmentation, American government has more
recently come to delegate increasing amounts of administrative discretion to agencies with which to develop solutions to complex
problems-and in some cases, even to define the problems themselves. Charles Reich, for instance, argues that the inherent nature of
a complex society has forced the development of centralized planning and administration. He further asserts that one effect has been
to transfer more and more of the legislative function from the legislature itself to administrative rulemaking procedures. 3 This practice
has relieved legislatures of problems too complex for legislative resolution, and increased greatly the discretionary authority of administrative agencies. To take the case of the Corps again, its modern
history shows a dramatic transformation from a narrow and specific
mission in navigation to a broad and discretionary mission in multiple purpose water resource development. The mission is still water
resource development, and the professional means are still engineering of public works, but the agency's discretion has been broadened
since 1925 to include flood control, hydroelectric power, recreation,
fish and wildlife enhancement, water supply, irrigation, and other
potential purposes.4 The tradeoffs among these objectives were left
2.
3.
4.
also
THE

Navigation Act of 1824, 4 Stat. 32.
Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966).
49 Stat. 1570 (1936), 58 Stat. 887 et seq. (1944), 76 Stat. 1178 et seq. (1962); see
AMERICAN PUBLIC WORKS ASSOCIATION, HISTORY OF PUBLIC WORKS IN
UNITED STATES 1776-1976, at 30-32 (1976).
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largely to the discretion of the agency in each individual case, with
little or no legislative guidance as to how they should be ranked.
Both these patterns were evident in early governmental efforts at
environmental protection. Originally seen as a discrete problem of
pollution control, environmental protection was managed at the local
level by municipal sewer and water authorities, and at the state level
as a regulatory function of state boards of health.' At the federal
level it was treated simply as a new mission (at first) for the Public
Health Service. 6 New research functions, grant authorities, and
eventually regulatory functions were lodged in a specific agency of
government to serve a single new mission-protecting the quality of
the ambient air and water. Even the Environmental Protection
Agency, created in 1970, was principally a single mission agency
dealing with air and water pollution control, despite the broader
image suggested by its title. 7 Since that time the EPA, like the Corps
of Engineers before it, has been subjected to enormous diversification of its missions and concomitant enlargement of its sphere of
administrative discretion, in ways that will be discussed more fully
below. The same is true of the federal energy agencies during the past
six years.
Within traditional mission agencies there were and are quite commonly more possible projects than there are funds and personnel to
execute them. This excess of ideas over resources within a given
mission is a conventional and well-known kind of overload, which
can be addressed by relatively well-known principles for allocating
scarce resources toward the achievement of a given objective.' The
diversification of an agency's mission, however, presents a new problem, namely striking a discretionary balance in resource allocation
among ends equally sanctioned by law. This choice problem can by
itself overload an agency's agenda in some cases, and it is compounded in cases where new policy demands-even if accompanied
by new resources-require action more rapidly than the agency can
adapt. In these cases one finds a microcosm of some of the most
vexing problems of public administration, which are intensified by
overload in the very areas in which society-acting through its legis5. HISTORY OF PUBLIC WORKS id. at 414-20; J. A. TARR, RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF WASTEWATER TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1800-1972
(1977).
6. L. B. DWORSKY, CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: WATER AND AIR
POLLUTION, 8-12 (1971); Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 264-272 (1976).
7. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §4321 note.
8. See for instance Guidelines for Estimating the Benefits of Public Expenditures. Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
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lature-most wants vigorous and effective administrative response.
The irony of this is unfortunate, and the phenomenon itself deserves
serious attention.
OVERLOAD
Within the past seven years, the governmental agenda in the area
of environmental protection has become seriously overloaded. By
"overload" I mean that the range of responsibilities legislated into
the domain of government agencies has expanded beyond the capability of those agencies to act upon them.9 It is useful to distinguish
separate sources of the present overload, and then four factors affected by it.
Sources
The environmental protection agenda has been overloaded from at
least four sources: increases in the number of government missions in
the environmental protection area; increases in the responsibilities of
each agency not matched by increases in its resources; increases in
responsibilities and resources but without adequate time to absorb
them effectively (crash programs); and increases in diversity and conflict among agency missions.
It is obvious to any observer that the number of government missions in the area of environmental protection has proliferated in the
past seven years. At the federal level, for instance, environmental
protection missions before 1970 were more or less limited (depending on one's definition) to air and water pollution control, wilderness
and historic preservation, funding for acquisition of recreational
lands, and soil conservation.' I Since that time missions have been
added for energy conservation' 1 and for reclamation of strip-mined
lands' 2 ; for the management of water and related land resources in
the so-called "coastal zone' ' ;" for protecting wetlands even on nonnavigable or intra-state water courses (under the Corps of Engineers
"404 permit program" "); for protecting threatened and endangered
9. Note that the agenda referred to here is the agenda of administrative agencies, not, as
in some political science literature, the legislature's agenda. Legislative agencies have their
own problems, which are not analyzed here.
10. Andrews, Three Fronts of Federal Environmental Policy, 37 J. AMER. INST. OF
PLANNERS 258 (1971); see also J. L. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY: THE
EISENHOWER, KENNEDY AND JOHNSON YEARS, Chapter 8 (1968).
11. E.g., Energy Policy and Conservation Act, P.L. 94-1963 (1975); Energy Conservation
and Production Act, P.L. 94-385 (1976).
12. Strip Mine Reclamation Act of 1978, P.L. 95-87.
13. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § § 1451-1464 (1976).
14. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, §404, 33 U.S.C.
§ §1161-1175 (Supp. 1973).
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species and their habitats1 ' ; for protecting the public against the
introduction of new toxic chemicals 1 6 ;for promoting the recovery
and recycling of material resources' 1; and for various other purposes. To these will probably soon be added others. I At the state
level, missions have been added in some states for land use controls;
for the control of erosion and sedimentation; for the preservation of
agricultural lands; for billboard control; and for numerous other
activities mandated by the federal missions listed above.' I Not all of
these are found in every state, but the list is broadly representative.
The increasing number of government missions may or may not
overload the agencies directly charged with implementing them, since
many of those listed are spread across numerous agencies of federal
and state government. However, they almost inevitably increase the
burden upon lower levels of government and upon private parties
who must deal with new public authority in these areas. State governments, for instance, may secure federal funds for coastal zone
management or energy conservation efforts, but only if they first
organize themselves to prepare coastal zone management plans and
energy conservation plans acceptable to the federal sponsoring agencies. 2 0 Local governments must participate in "area-wide waste treatment plans" if they hope to secure federal financial assistance for the
construction of sewage treatment facilities.2 To the extent that
state and local agencies are unable to comply fully with these new
federal and state environmental mandates, or in some cases even to
begin to address them, their agendas have been overloaded relative to
their capabilities.
A second overload is the assignment of responsibilities to any one
agency in excess of its capabilities to implement. The federal Environmental Protection Agency alone, for instance, has had substantial additions to its responsibilities since 1970-the establishment of
national air pollution standards; mandatory review of other agencies'
environmental impact statements; the administration of a six billion
dollar public works program for waste treatment plants; the identification and certification of "best practicable" and best available"
technologies for water pollution control, industry by industry; the
15. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § §1531-1543 (1976) (as amended by
P.L. 95-1625, 1978).
16. Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § § 2601-2629.
17. Resource Recovery Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §3251-3254F, 3256-3259 (1970); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §6901 (1976).
18. A major issue before the present Congress, for instance, is the control of dumping of
hazardous waste materials.
19. Cf.E. MOSS (ed.), LAND USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES (1977).
20. See Note 11,supra.
21. See Note 14,supra, §208.
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establishment of standards for noise-generating products; the approval or denial of permits for all point sources of water pollution,
nationwide; the approval of area-wide waste treatment plans; and the
approval of new toxic chemicals for marketing.2 2 This list names
only a few of EPA's major new responsibilities. Moreover, all of these
are added to the agency's previously existing mandates for research,
enforcement, and other missions. To the extent that the EPA's resources and capabilities have not been expanded at the same rate as
its responsibilities, its agenda has been overloaded.
The third source of overload is the enactment of new "crash"
programs, even accompanied by substantial funding, where the inputs of resources exceed the agency's organizational capacity to use
them effectively. The most obvious current example is the U.S.
Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies, whose agenda
includes the implementation on a crash basis of a vast amount of new
legislation, composed of numerous individual mandates with few, if
2
any, clear priorities among them.

Examples of these two forms of overload at the state and local
level undoubtedly exist as well, but even those at the federal level
cause important problems of choice for state and local governments.
Perhaps the most important of these problems is uncertainty about
which among its missions the overloaded federal agency will choose
to implement and at what rate implementation will proceed. Lack of
22. Statutory mandates including significant new responsibilities for the EPA include the
following: Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 1857-1858a (1976); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § §1251-1265, 1281-1292, 1311-1328, 1341-1345,
1361-1376, as amended by P.L. 94-558 (1976) and P.L. 95-217 (1977); Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C.A. § 135 et seq.; Resource Recovery Act
of 1970 (omitted in the general amendment of the Solid Waste Disposal Act by Pub. L.
94-580, 90 Stat. 95, Oct. 21, 1976. Current version codified in scattered sections at Title
42.); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §6901-6986 (1976);
Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § §4901-4918 (1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § § 201, 300f-300j (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § §2601-2629
(1976). Its budget outlays grew from $384 million in 1970 to $5 billion in 1978.
23. Statutory mandates including significant new responsibilities for the Department of
Energy and its predecessor agencies-in particular the Federal Energy Administration and
Energy Research and Development Administration-include the following: Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § §5801-5891 (1976); Energy Supply and Environmental
Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § § 791-98; Federal Energy Administration Act of
1974, 5 U.S.C. § §761-86; Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of
1974, 42 U.S.C. § § 5901-17 (1976); Geothermal Energy Research, Development and Demonstration Act of 1974, 30 U.S.C. § § 1101-64; Solar Energy Research, Development, and
Demonstration Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § §5551-5566 (1976); Solar Heating and Cooling
Demonstration Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § §5501-5517 (1976); Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § §6201, 6211, 6231-6422 (1976); Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 1125 (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 42 U.S.C.);
Department of Energy Reorganization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7131; National Energy Act
of 1978, P.L. 95-617. This law is itself an omnibus combining five major bills. The budget
overlays of these agencies grew from $245.9 million in 1970 to $8.1 billion in 1978.
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knowledge on this point can leave state and local governments in a
vacuum as to how to obtain authorized federal funds-or even, indeed, how to comply with requirements of federal law.
The fourth source of overload is the diversification of missions,
which has caused intensified conflict both among agencies and increasingly within agencies, at all three levels of government. This
diversification was recognized and heightened by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). One of the principal origins
of NEPA was congressional concern that agencies were failing to
consider the effects of their mission-oriented activities on other recognized public purposes, and even to consult with each other in cases
where their missions overlapped Qr conflicted.' ' This concern led to
the enactment of a broad declaration of national environmental
policy, and to the requirement that prior to taking major federal
actions, detailed environmental impact statements be prepared and
reviewed by all relevant agencies. Similar requirements have been
created by statute or executive order in over one-third of the fifty
states.2 s
As important in practice as NEPA, however, is the interpenetration of regulatory and planning missions among agencies. For example, the U.S. Forest Service was traditionally a mission agency
with missions and authority as precisely defined as the early Corps of
Engineers. Now, however, it can no longer manage its forest simply
by its own professional standards of multiple use and sustained-yield.
It must satisfy the air and water quality standards of the Environmental Protection Agency; it must be cognizant of coastal zone management plans in forests that fall within the coastal zone; it must
take account of the Corps' requirements for permits in wetland and
watercourse areas; it must search out and protect endangered and
threatened species and their habitats; and it must prepare environmental impact statements for all its major actions.' 6 Similarly, state
24. R. ANDREWS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE
(1976).
25. S. HART, GREEN GOALS AND GREENBACKS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
STATE LEVEL EIS PROGRAMS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED COSTS (1978).
26. S. FAIRFAX (ed.), LEGAL ASPECTS OF WILDLANDS MANAGEMENT (1977).
(Proceedings of a Conference held April 8-9, 1977. Ann Arbor, Michigan: School of Natural
Resources, The University of Michigan, 1977.) Among the new laws affecting the public
land management agencies are the following (see note 22, supra, for full citations): Clean
Air Act; Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972; Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1970; Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of
1972; Endangered and Threatened Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § § 1531-1543; Toxic
Substances Control Act; Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974,
16 U.S.C. § §581h, 1601-1614; National Forest Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2949,
16 U.S.C. § 1600 et seq. (note); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 90 Stat.
2744 (cofidied in scattered sections of 7, 16, 30, 40, 43 U.S.C.).
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and local governments can no longer deal simply with their "mission" counterparts at high levels of government, but must incorporate into each action proposal consideration of numerous laws and
missions that bear directly or indirectly upon the proposed action.
To the extent that they are unable to comply with all of these
requirements, or in many cases even to insure that they know of
them, their agencies have become overloaded.
Factors
Overload is a function of the relationship between an agency's
responsibilities and its capabilities. We have discussed changes in responsibilities above; it remains to identify the factors that limit
agency capability. Each factor operates to cause a different form of
overload, requiring a different strategy for coping with it. These
factors include budget and personnel, time, knowledge, and role clarity.
Budget and personnel are lumped together for convenience, since
they are the most conventional and well-recognized constraint on
agency capability. They are a particularly obvious constraint when
additional responsibilities are thrust upon an existing agency, such as
in the EPA case mentioned above. To the extent that new resources
are not included to match new responsibilities, the new mission will
be in direct competition with previously existing mandates, and at
least one if not both will suffer from the overload.
Two characteristic features of recent environmental legislation
highlight the importance of the time factor in agency overload: new
organizational structures and implementation deadlines. Examples of
the former include the Environmental Protection Agency and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration2 7; the Federal
Energy Administration, Energy Research and Development Administration, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and now Department of
Energy 2 8; and the Council on Environmental Quality. 9 Counterparts to many of these agencies have also been created in state governments. Examples of implementation deadlines include the 1977
"best practicable," 1983 "best available," and 1985 "no pollution"
targets established by the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1972 0 ;
the 1978 deadline for identification of all federal interest land claims
in Alaska 3' ; deadlines for both emission control and energy conser27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Reorganization Plans No. 3 and No. 4 of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §4321 (note).
Department of Energy Reorganization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7131.
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § §4321-4347 (1976).
See note 22, supra.
Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, 42 U.S.C. § § 1601-1628.
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vation in automobiles3 2 ; and deadlines too numerous to mention for
the completion of planning and reporting requirements.
The time factor is an important constraint in two respects. First, it
presents at least a short-term overload problem in any situation
where a major new mission is added to government, particularly
when the addition is accompanied by the creation of a new organizational structure: there is inevitably an adjustment period before the
mission will be smoothly and effectively implemented. Aside from
adjustment difficulties, the nature and complexity of problems may
require certain minimum periods-and in some cases, lengthy periods
-of time for their resolution. Second, time is a particular constraint
in cases where statutory implementation deadlines have been established. Deadlines assist agency administrators in setting priorities,
since the legislature has implicitly established certain priorities by
setting deadlines for them; but the result can be a distortion of
agency effort toward the completion of paperwork and away from
substantive progress. Deadlines for the latter often are less clearly
defined than the former. In cases where statutory deadlines violate
either the technical constraints of the problem or the staff and budget capabilities of the agency, the result is poorer work and euphemistic reporting.
Knowledge is a particularly important constraint in the environmental area, since popular and legislative concern often outdistance
reliable knowledge of how severe a problem is or how to remedy it.
Many important ecological questions still can only be answered by
basic research, and in many of these cases no amount of staff or
money will appreciably accelerate the process.3 The same problem
exists in the testing of new technologies, such as catalytic converters
for auto emission control or emergency core cooling systems for
nuclear power plants. To the extent that statutory mandates require
results that exceed existing knowledge, agency agendas are necessarily overloaded with mandates that must either be postponed or be
implemented by guesswork.
Finally, agency agendas are overloaded by the proliferation of
mandates without clear priorities for implementation. Substantial
time and effort are required to absorb new mandates, both for individuals and for the agency as a whole. They must be digested and
32. Clean Air Act, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (see note
22, supra).
33. For instance, neither the dose-response relationships between carcinogenic chemicals
and human health, nor the elastic limits of ecosystems to accept stress without fundamental
change, are well understood; and neither can be well understood by short term research
funding.
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interpreted, delegated and routinized. They also must be weighed
against previous priorities and adjustments not only made, but negotiated and coordinated with other affected units. Finally, they must
frequently be implemented with the involvement of other parties.
When too many new missions are added at once, the friction of this
process increases even more. Even if an agency has adequate amounts
of budget, personnel, time, and knowledge, its capability may be so
overloaded by conflicting objectives that it cannot define clear
courses of action. This potential administrative deficiency is accentuated by the expanded role of the judiciary in reviewing administrative actions over the past ten years.
Each form of overload is related, though imperfectly, to its
sources. The addition of new government missions, for instance, may
overload any of the four factors. The addition of responsibilities in
excess of resources, on the other hand, may tend to overload primarily the budget and personnel and perhaps the time of the responsible agency. Crash programs and increased interpenetration of missions fall heaviest on goal clarity, though to some extent they affect
the other factors as well.
In all these cases, however, the overload is real, and it has become
an important factor, if not the dominant factor, with which public
administrators in the fields of environmental protection and energy
must cope. We turn now, therefore, to an examination of strategies
for coping with the overloaded agenda.
PRESENT STRATEGIES FOR COPING
The problem of overload is not a product of broadened administrative discretion per se. Indeed, as the previous discussion of statutory deadlines indicates, overload would be no less possible, and in
fact even more likely, if Congress were to enact stricter goals and
standards of achievement. Overload occurs when an agency's capabilities are overtaxed, and as far as administrative discretion is concerned, the problem is that overload forces upon the agency a form
of administrative discretion undesirable to administrators as well as
to the public. It forces the administrator to choose among several
legislative mandates of apparently equal importance. For the federal
or state administrator, there is now not only far more work to do,
but far more kinds of work to do than in the past. Not only are there
few clear sources of priorities, but there is also a likelihood of both
political opposition and lawsuits whatever the administrator may do.
For local and some state administrators, there is the further problem
of coping with uncertainty as to what mandates higher level adminis-
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trators will choose to implement. The choice that is made will influence their decisions as to what requirements to comply with, what
forms of aid to apply for, and what the net benefits and costs of
compliance or application will be to them.
Present efforts to cope with overload on the environmental agenda
appear dominated by six principal approaches. Each of these responses is understandable, but each, except possibly the last, exhibits
major drawbacks as an approach to responsible public administration.
Spread Too Thin
The most obvious approach to overload is to try to do a little of
everything. This approach has benefits as a defensive form of administration: it protects the agency against the charge that it is ignoring
its responsibilities by enabling it in any such case to present at least
some staff unit that is "working on" the issue in question. While this
approach is widespread, it is costly, since the result is almost inevitably to spread available resources too thinly to achieve effective
results.
In cases where overload is due to interpenetrating missions rather
than merely responsibilities in excess of resources, this approach has
an additional drawback: it provides no means for resolving conflicts
among missions. It simply puts people to work on each fragmented
piece of a problem and relies on the ad hoc knocking of heads to
resolve conflicts.
Specific Requirements First
A second approach is to put first priority upon actions that are
specifically required, following these at a more gradual pace (and
perhaps with resources spread too thinly) with the actions that are
more generally defined. In some cases this is a very appropriate
response. When the legislature sets a statutory deadline for implementation of pollution standards, for instance, it is proper to treat
this as a specific mandate that is intended to have higher priority
than more general responsibilities. In other cases, however, the specificity of the task may have been relatively arbitrary (for example,
specific dates attached to reporting requirements); and in such cases
attachment of highest priority by the agency to the most specific
mandates may distort the agency's activities. A particular case in
point is the implementation of the National Environmental Policy
Act, in which the preparation of environmental impact statements
(its most specific requirement) has taken on a life of its own indepen-
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dent of the law's substantive purposes." 4 The other requirements of
that law have been virtually ignored. Aside from the danger of the
distortion, giving first priority to strictly specified mandates provides
only a first step in establishing priorities under overloaded conditions.
Tokenism
A third approach is the use of small numbers of symbolic actions
as substitutes for the full implementation that scarce resources do
not permit. In enforcement proceedings, for instance, agencies have
sometimes singled out major and visible polluters as targets for enforcement actions, in the hope that making examples of these firms
will intimidate others into complying voluntarily (since the agency has
insufficient resources to prosecute all violators). The strategy may
backfire, of course, especially since major corporations can afford
batteries of talented lawyers more easily than can other potential
defendants. Other guilty parties may simply continue business as
usual, profiting from the time delay and assuming-often correctlythat the agency may never get around to suing them. The strategy
has been used nonetheless.
Another form of this approach is exemplified by President Nixon's
stoppage of the Cross Florida Barge Canal, by press release. Here the
apparent goal was to placate a vocal constituency with a single major
symbolic action rather than applying similar criteria to all similar
projects.'I In either case, this approach works only if people respond to the symbol in the way that the agency intends, an assumption that may not withstand scrutiny. In either case, a more fundamental criticism of this approach is that it represents simply a defensive political response rather than a defensible strategy for public
administration.
Path of Least Resistance
A response more sensitive to public opinion, particularly in cases
where overload is due to interpenetration of missions, is to follow
the path of least resistance: implement the mandates that are relatively noncontroversial. In the case of water resource projects, for
instance, recent decisions are sometimes based upon judgments of
"project viability"-that is, the expectation that public resistance will
be sufficiently low to permit efficient completion of the project. In
34. See note 24, supra; also, Andrews, NEPA in Practice: Environmental Policy or Administrative Reform?, 6 ELR 50001 (1976).
35. See note 24, supra, at pp. 72, n.n. 183 & 184.

July 1979]

ENVIRONMENTAND ENERGY

state and local governments, a similar phenomenon takes the form of
political opportunism in seeking funds for the kinds of actions that
look most politically feasible rather than those that may be more
objectively "necessary" to their jurisdictions' previous priorities. This
approach has the obvious political benefit of minimizing controversy,
and thus reducing the costs of friction that arise when organized
opposition arises to a particular course of action. Like the preceding
approaches, therefore, it is understandable. In the extreme, however,
it can result in abandonment of administrative responsibility to the
veto power of vocal minorities. To say this is not to point a finger at
any particular group, environmentalists or industry or otherwise; it is
simply to say that some controversial actions should probably be
given high priority anyway, and many noncontroversial actions
should not. Should EPA or DOE, or any agency, simply grease the
wheels that squeak loudest? Like spreading resources too thin, following the path of least resistance is ultimately an abdication of
administrative responsibility for setting priorities.
Personal Preferences
The worst of all possible approaches, of course, is to use overload
as an excuse simply to aggrandize personal preferences, and to implement whatever pieces of the mandate a particular administrator
wishes while ignoring others on the grounds of lack of resources.
Bluntly stated in this way, all public administrators would probably
consider this approach inappropriate, and most would probably consider it unethical. The approach has a more subtle form as well,
however, of which many are guilty from time to time in varying
degrees. This form is the subjective judgment of "political infeasibility," which leads to favoring some actions over others. In all fairness to governmental agencies, the degree of overload that has been
thrust upon some of them in recent years has all but necessitated this
approach. In the face of numerous new mandates, and in the relative
absence of clear priorities among them, the administrator may have
little choice but to pursue his own subjective judgment in deciding
which to emphasize. But at best this approach lacks accountability,
and at worst it may yield capricious or unethical results.
Executive Preferences
The sixth and final approach is the deliberate use of an overload
situation by the chief executive and his appointees to set coherent
programmatic priorities, by choice within the overloaded agenda. A
President or governor and his agency head might, for instance, con-
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sciously evaluate the agency's authorities and deliberately decide to
concentrate on some missions and ignore others. This approach is
both legitimate and desirable up to a reasonable point, a point that
was clearly overreached by President Nixon in his assertion of
authority to impound budgetary appropriations.3 6 It has the virtue
of strong accountability of the administrative agencies to the chief
executive, though by the same token it might weaken the agency's
accountability to the legislature. The establishment of the optimum
balance among these branches, however, is not within the scope of
the present paper. This approach can be expected to work only when
the chief executive takes the initiative, a situation that frequently has
not existed in the federal government and that has been lacking in
some state and local governments as well.
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
Two principles are central in the discussion above. The first is that
coping with overload requires setting priorities. Each of the approaches above represents either a method for setting priorities or a
way of trying to avoid setting them. In the context of overload,
setting priorities means deciding at least implicitly that some statutory mandates will not be implemented soon if at all, and accepting
the quasi-legislative responsibility as well as the political risks that
accompany such decisions. The second principle is that such decisions must be made consciously, legitimately, and accountably,
rather than by default, by inertia, or by bureaucratic preference. In
this spirit, the following possibilities for improvement might be considered.
Integration of Mandates
An essential first step in coping rationally with overload is making
a coherent analysis of the responsibilities that have caused an agency
to be overloaded. In some cases such an analysis may already exist,
but in many it does not. Only recently, for instance, did the state of
Massachusetts contract with a consultant to pull together an integrated analysis of the laws, regulations, and policies bearing upon
highway planning in that state. 3 7' This sort of analysis is a valuable
36. Appropriated funds are allocated to agencies over time by the Office of Management
and Budget, and are sometimes held back until later times-if not indefinitely-by OMB for
reasons such as reducing inflation. President Nixon sought to hold back funds on a more
selective basis for policy reasons, which would have amounted to an item veto of Congressional Legislation. The courts held this to be improper. See A. SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
37. D. AGGERHOLM et al., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: A COMPEN-
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exercise in any agency, and it is vital where overload requires setting
priorities. The need for such analysis is particularly acute at lower
levels of government where knowledge of higher-level mandates and
opportunities is often deficient.
Effective Chief Executive
A second suggestion is to urge an effective role for the chief executive-mayor, governor, or President-in setting priorities for coping
with overload. This role is desirable on constitutional grounds, and
because only the chief executive has perspective across agency mission lines. This approach is made possible and effective by the integrative analysis suggested above. In practice, agencies are frequently
left to set their own priorities without close oversight or coordination, and the unguided administrative discretion that results is less
and less viable as agencies' agendas become overloaded and mandates
become closely interwoven.
Accountability for Priorities
The third suggestion is for explicit and public decisions on goals
and priorities, subject to both suggestions and reactions by the affected public. Some have suggested that vague or conflicting mandates should be thrown back to the legislature for more detailed
specification, but this suggestion seems somewhat unrealistic as a
general practice since such mandates are often the legislature's way
of clearing its own agenda of problems it cannot solve or agree upon.
The real need is not for less administrative discretion, but for clearer
accountability-to the chief executive and to the public-for how
that discretion is used, especially in the establishment of goals and
priorities.
Several recent events provide examples of how such decisions can
be made. One is the passage of the National Forest Management
Act. 3 8 Congress, faced with a complex set of technical problems that
it could not substantively resolve itself, passed a law that provided
substantial increases in administrative discretion to the implementing
agency, but coupled this discretion with explicit procedural and
reporting requirements to insure that the discretion was exercised on
the basis of a public record, with opportunities for input and review
by all interested parties. This public record also included long-term
DIUM OF LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES FOR HIGHWAYS (1975). See also
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, DIGEST
OF WATER RESOURCES POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES, EP 1165-2-1 (1972).
38. National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § § 1600-1676.
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forest management plans, to be updated periodically, which would
amount to publicly reviewable statements of goals and objectives as
well as priorities.
A second example, or set of examples, is the recent use of goal
planning in various states and regions. Well-known examples include
the areawide water quality management plans required by Section
208 of the 1972 Clean Water Act amendments. 3 Such plans to date
have been varied in their quality, but they do provide a publicly
accountable basis for setting priorities-in a sense, a framework of
goals to accompany the integration of mandates suggested above.
Whatever the specific examples, the establishment of priorities
must be done consciously and publicly, with advance notice of proposed action, public hearings when appropriate, and opporutnities
for review and revision before final decisions. Without such guideposts and safeguards, overload can create incongruous and ineffective
administration.
Task Forces
A fourth solution, particularly in cases where overload is due principally to interpenetration of mandates, is the more extensive use of
interagency task forces that cut across the traditional missionoriented agency structure. Task forces have recently come into more
extensive use at the federal level as a means of dealing with complex
planning problems: the Arctic natural gas pipeline decision is one
particularly salient example.4 0 The task forces suggested here are not
intended to function as additional advisory committees, but as actual
implementing bodies, where both goals and expertise can be drawn
together into interdisciplinary planning and compromise. Such organizations could not be created for every decision that must be made,
but they could provide a valuable forum both for setting priorities
and for implementing high priority decisions.
Self-Enforcing Mandates
Finally, a long-term legislative suggestion is to substitute, wherever
possible, self-enforcing mandates for those that require agencyimplemented programs. One of the most important overloading factors on both the energy and the environmental protection agendas,
for instance, has been the propensity of the Congress to require an
39. See note 14, supra.
40. This was a major federal decision requiring coordination among several federal agencies. Accordingly a task force was set up, with representation from all affected agencies and
facilitation by the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, to pull together the necessary
analysis, public comment, and decision recommendations. It did not, however, have continuing authority to implement the actions proposed.
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agency to set standards, award and administer contracts, enforce the
laws against violations, and bear the burden of proof in each case. All
of these are enormously costly and time consuming approaches to
policy making. In many cases more effective as well as more efficient
results could be achieved by implementation of self-enforcement
devices, such as changes in legal liability of private polluters, changes
in the burden of proof that an action is or is not violating standards
of safety or environmental quality, and the imposition of unit prices
or taxes for actions that pollute or overload environmental carrying
capacity. These approaches are not costless, but they have the potential to reduce substantially the present overload on administrative
agencies. 4 1 Coupled with conscious and accountable priorities by the
chief executive and administrative agencies, they might at least amelioriate some of the most vexing overload problems.
CONCLUSION
The administrative burden posed by numerous and complex environmental mandates has sometimes been used to argue that government should reduce its activities in this area in order to let other
activities go forward. Reduction of governmental activity is not suggested here. The argument here is not that environmental protection
(or energy) is good or bad as an area of government activity, but that
its agenda has been overloaded, and that many of the agencies' strategies for coping with this overload are undesirable. The same problem
could arise in any area of government policy. The point, therefore, is
to suggest changes in approach that might improve the ability of
agencies to cope with this overload intelligently, and avoid either
floundering through it hoping that inattention to certain problems
will not be challenged, or simply wishing that the problems would go
away.
The flood of legislation shows no signs of abating soon, as long as
legislators are rewarded for legislating, and news media are rewarded
for identifying new public problems about which to legislate. Since
the agencies must deal with the task of implementing these mandates, however, they must learn to do so deliberately and accountably as political decision making authorities, rather than in the traditional spirit of mere technical implementation of orders given by
others. The overload is real, and it can be managed. It must be
managed, however, as a problem of accountable public policymaking
not merely of administrative convenience.
41. Cf F. ANDERSON et al., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977).

